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LOSING THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT: DEFINING
WAIVER TO BETTER ADDRESS A DEFENDANT'S
ACTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON A WITNESS
David J. Tess*
The American criminal justice system often is criticized for
its cumbersome and inefficient nature. The complex network
of procedural safeguards designed to protect the constitutional
rights of the accused can seem overly formalistic. Explicit
constitutional rights of the criminal defendant at trial include
the right to an attorney,' the right to a jury trial,2 the right to
be free from compelled self-incrimination,3 and the right to call
and confront witnesses.4 These rights provide the fundamental
guarantees of fairness and due process in an adversarial
system of criminal justice. Providing such rights, however,
entails a great expenditure of resources. As a result, courts can
be tempted to find ways to make the exercise of these rights
less costly to the state while still affirming their existence.
Waiver is one of the primary methods courts have employed
to achieve this paradoxical result. As one commentator has
noted, "ilt is waiver of rights that permits the system of
criminal justice to work at all."5 Courts have determined that
criminal defendants are able to waive a number of important
rights by pleading guilty,6 waiving a jury trial,7 and failing to
raise possible defenses.' A number of courts have concluded
that defendants also may indirectly waive rights, such as the
* Editor in Chief, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 27,
1994. B.S. 1989, Loyola University Chicago; M.A. 1991, University of Illinois; J.D.
1993, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Marisa G6mez, Peter
Hardy, and Stacie Brown for their insightful edits and comments.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
3. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308, 318-19 (1976) (prohibiting prosecutors from making adverse statements
regarding a defendant's refusal to testify).
4. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
5. Michael E. Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1970).
6. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242 (1969); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4)
("(Bly pleading guilty ... [the defendant] waives the right to a trial.").
7. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,275 (1942); see also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (requiring waiver to be in writing with the approval of the court and
consent of the government).
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f); United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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right to be present at trial9 or the right to confront witnesses, 10
through their own misconduct. This Note examines the manner
in which courts have concluded that certain acts of misconduct
by a defendant lead to the waiver of the confrontation right.
The notion of waiver of the right to confrontation" operating
through a defendant's misconduct has existed for some time,
and its use recently has become especially prevalent in helping
to establish the existence of conspiracies in drug-related
cases." Courts and commentators, however, have been unable
to arrive at any consensus as to what conduct is sufficient to
constitute waiver of the confrontation right. In addition, they
have been unable to provide any rigorous analysis of the
reasons underlying the conclusion that misconduct can lead to
the loss of the right to confront. Their failure to articulate this
reasoning has significant implications.
Waiver of any right, especially waiver of a right which
operates through a defendant's misconduct, is a way for the
courts and the society in which they operate to engage in a
type of double gesture. Courts are able to proclaim that they
are affording a defendant due process and at the same time
avoid the expense of providing full procedural protection. More
importantly, waiver operating through the defendant's miscon-
duct allows blame for this procedural short-cut to be placed
with the defendant, thereby relieving the person finding waiver
of much of the responsibility for that result. This Note argues
that courts should not lightly allow the loss of procedural
rights as important as the right to confront to occur in such a
duplicitous fashion.
Part I of this Note examines the current legal landscape
regarding a defendant's waiver of the right to confrontation.
This Part explores the justifications courts have provided for
finding a waiver of the confrontation right, both through the
use of the traditional "intentional relinquishment of a known
right" standard and the less precise formulations of waiver
found in cases of defendant misconduct. Part II offers a critique
of the reasoning courts employ to find waiver of the right to
9. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10tb Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980).
11. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
12. See infra Part II.
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confrontation. In the process, the analysis explores general
theories of waiver which have been advanced by other commen-
tators. In so doing, this Note seeks to arrive at a theory of
waiver of the confrontation right through a defendant's miscon-
duct which is both descriptive, in that it more accurately
characterizes what courts are either doing or attempting to do,
and normative, in that it offers an understanding of waiver
which, if employed, can better protect the rights of witnesses
and defendants. Part III then applies this theory of waiver to
the context of child abuse.
Cases of child sexual abuse provide a forum in which a
theory of waiver can be tested. Reports of child abuse have
increased dramatically in recent years.' 3 At the same time,
false allegations of abuse have become more common.14 In this
atmosphere, both courts and commentators have noted the
importance of carefully considering both the right of the
defendant to a fair trial and the right of the victim to not be
revictimized by the trial. Moreover, considerations of the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, and the role of the Confrontation
Clause in preserving that right, have been given more atten-
tion in the context of child sexual abuse than in the context of
drug-related cases where waiver is more frequently and more
easily employed. 5
Despite this heightened concern with defendants' rights in
cases of child sexual abuse, prosecutors utilize a number of
methods to reduce the trauma of confrontation to the child.
13. See, e.g., Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation
of Traumatized Witnesses: Defining "Confrontation" to Protect Both Children and
Defendants, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 185, 185 & n.1 (1991) (citing AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL NEGLECT AND ABUSE
REPORTING 1985, at 3, 18 (1987)).
14. See RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL VICTIMS OF THE WAR
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE 300-02 (1990) (analogizing false allegations with Salem witch
hunts); Alexander Cockburn, Out of the Mouth of Babes: Child Abuse and the Abuse
of Adults, NATION, Feb. 12, 1990, at 190, 191 (likening recent waves of investigations
of "virtual abuse" of children to the communist scare of the 1950s and to Satan
hunts); Lee Coleman & Patrick E. Clancy, False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse,
5 CRIM. JUST., Fall 1990, at 15, 15, 18-19; Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged Molestation
Victim, The Rules of Evidence, and the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen
and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227, 239-40 (1988) (suggesting that the use of
repetitive questioning techniques undermines the reliability of the victims' testimo-
ny). But see David P.H. Jones & J. Melbourne McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious
Accounts of Sexual Abuse to Children, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 27, 38 (1987)
(finding that only eight percent of child sexual abuse cases studied were fictitious).
15. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (child sexual abuse); United States
v. Mastrangelo, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (drug-related case).
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Efforts to distance the child from the courtroom, such as the
use of closed-circuit television 16 and a screen between the child
and the accused,' 7 have met with varying success." Yet even
these methods presuppose that children can respond in a
manner required by the rules of evidence. This can be difficult
for children whose responses often lack the cogency, detail, and
persuasiveness that the jury may require to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.'9 In addition, the unfamiliar and
intimidating courtroom setting and the difficult questions
asked during cross-examination can cause a child who origin-
ally appeared competent to become unable to testify.20
Faced with this dilemma, prosecutors often have attempted
to admit children's testimony under one of the hearsay excep-
tions.2 ' The most commonly used are the excited utterance
exception22 and the residual exceptions. 23 Evidence introduced
under one of these exceptions must still meet requirements of
reliability in order to ensure that the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights have not been violated. The prohibition on the
uses of after-the-fact corroboration of a child's statement in
determining the statement's reliability24 has created difficulty
for prosecutors who seek to admit threatening statements. It
also has resulted in the judiciary's more liberal application of
the excited utterance and residual exceptions.25
The waiver cases examined in Part I point to an alternative
to introducing evidence under these hearsay exceptions and
16. Craig, 497 U.S. at 836.
17. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
18. In Craig, the Supreme Court upheld the use of closed circuit television where
necessary to prevent specific trauma to a child witness, Craig, 497 U.S. at 856-57,
860, while in Coy, the Court overturned the use of a screen separating the victim from
the accused where there was no particularized showing of harm to the child witness.
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21.
19. See Schwalb, supra note 13, at 187; Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Ap-
proach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745,
1751-52 (1983).
20. See DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES
AND PROSECUTORS 17-18 (1985); Schwalb, supra note 13, at 187.
21. Where the child's statements cannot be introduced under one of these hearsay
exceptions, the prosecution may be forced to forego prosecution altogether. Schwalb,
supra note 13, at 187.
22. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
23. In the Federal Rules of Evidence the residual exceptions are Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5). The Rules are identical except that 804(b)(5) requires that the declarant
be unavailable at trial. See infra note 60.
24. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).
25. Donald A. Dripps, The Confrontation Clause and the Sexual Abuse of Children,
TRIAL, May 1991, at 11.
Losing the Right to Confront 881
engaging in a convoluted reliability analysis. That alternative
entails establishing an indirect waiver or forfeiture of the
confrontation right by showing that the defendant intimidated
the child witness into not testifying. A carefully crafted theory
of waiver can function as a way to more directly address the
defendant's acts of intimidation. Rather than distorting hear-
say exceptions or the definition of reliability, courts and
commentators can focus on the underlying conflict between the
defendant's right to confrontation and his actions, if any, in
intimidating the witness. Nevertheless, this alternative can
possess the same danger as waivers addressed in Part I,
namely that it may be used to curtail a defendant's right
without providing a convincing rationale for why that right
should be restricted. The recently renewed concern with false
charges of child sexual abuse illustrates the dangers of an
unfocused application of waiver while at the same time tests
the theory of waiver formulated in Part II. In this manner, this
Note attempts to elicit some general principles regarding how
intimidation might be defined to protect the rights of both the
alleged victim and the accused.
I. CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Waiver of the Right of Confrontation
The right provided by the Confrontation Clause26 is a per-
sonal right of the accused intended for her benefit." This right,
like other federally guaranteed rights, can be waived.28 Yet a
waiver ordinarily is valid only if there is "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege."29 Such an express waiver of the right to confrontation can
take a variety of forms. The accused may enter a plea of guilty
to the crimes he is accused of committing."0 The accused may
26. See supra note 11.
27. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
28. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
30. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (holding that if the
defendant pleads guilty in a manner which is "intelligent and voluntary," this plea
results in a waiver of several of the defendant's constitutional rights, including her
right to confrontation).
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decide not to cross-examine a witness at trial.31 If the accused
stipulates to the admission of evidence, this also will constitute
a waiver of the right to confront the source of that evidence.32
Ordinarily it is possible to analyze these actions under the
traditional Johnson v. Zerbst33 standard requiring "an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." 34 A trial judge may refuse to accept a guilty plea
until convinced that the defendant understands the right she
is waiving and that the defendant fully intends to waive that
right.35
An express waiver, however, is not the only way in which the
defendant may waive his constitutional right to confrontation.
The confrontation right may be waived indirectly. Examples of
indirect waiver include absenting oneself from the trial 6 and
engaging in contemptuous behavior which requires removal
from the court.3" Such acts also can be analyzed under the
classic Zerbst standard of waiver for the prosecution's use of
hearsay. For example, a trial judge can inform an unruly
defendant that continued disruptive behavior will result in the
defendant's removal from the courtroom and waiver of the right
to confront witnesses presented against him.3 8
Finally, an accused may waive the right to confrontation by
engaging in acts of misconduct that cause a witness to become
unavailable to testify. Such acts may include threatening or
killing a potential witness after legal proceedings have be-
gun.39 It is not clear, however, whether other less-drastic acts
31. See, e.g., Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 1 (stating that a defendant's decision not to
cross-examine the witnesses results in a waiver of the right to confrontation). In
Brookhart, the Court failed to find that defendant had waived his constitutional rights
because he "neither personally waived his right nor acquiesced in his lawyer's
attempted waiver." Id. at 8.
32. United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974).
33. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
34. Id. at 464.
35. See Roger W. Kirst, The Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66
NEB. L. REV. 485, 508 (1987).
36. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973).
37. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-47 (1970). The Court held that there were
"at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an
obstreperous defendant... : (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2)
cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct
himself properly." Id. at 343-44.
38. 304 U.S. at 458.
39. E.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982).
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also may result in a waiver of confrontation. First, one must
determine whether a finding of waiver by misconduct must
meet the classic standard as defined in Zerbst.4" If this stan-
dard must be met in all cases where waiver is alleged, then it
is likely that a prosecutor would have to prove that a defen-
dant threatened a witness for the explicit purpose of prevent-
ing her testimony at trial.4' If the classic standard is not the
only way to find waiver, however, it may be sufficient for the
prosecutor to show that the witness is absent due to the
defendant's misconduct, without having to show that the
defendant intended to keep the witness from testifying.42
While the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of areas that
the classic standard of waiver will be sufficient* to allow the
prosecution's use of hearsay, it has not explicitly required
application of this standard. 43 Lower courts have used this
silence to fashion their own standards for waiver when the
defendant's misconduct results in the unavailability of a
witness.
1. When a Defendant's Misconduct Constitutes Waiver-The
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of waiver of the right
to confront in Reynolds v. United States.44 In this case, the
defendant refused to reveal a witness's location to the process
server.45 The Court found sufficient evidence that the defen-
dant was responsible for the witness's unavailability.46 Its
discussion focused on the waiver which resulted from the
defendant's misconduct:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against
him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful pro-
curement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is
admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept
away.... If, therefore, when absent by [the defendant's]
procurement, [the witness's] evidence is supplied in some
40. 304 U.S. at 464.
41. Kirst, supra note 35, at 507.
42. Id. at 507-08.
43. See id. at 507.
44. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
45. Id. at 159-60.
46. Id. at 160.
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lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his consti-
tutional rights have been violated.47
Reynolds is of further significance because the hearsay involved
was prior testimony of the witness given at an earlier trial of
the same defendant on another indictment.48 The Court could
have analyzed the case as involving prior testimony with a
prior opportunity to confront, but instead focused on waiver.
The Court's waiver analysis is broad enough to cover a wide
variety of fact situations where the defendant's misconduct has
resulted in the unavailability of a witness, perhaps including
misconduct less overt than threats and murder.49
In most of the cases in which the Supreme Court has consid-
ered allowing a prosecution claim of waiver as a basis for
introducing hearsay statements, the Court has applied the
classic standard articulated in Zerbst. These cases have not
involved the defendant's conduct in procuring the unavailabil-
ity of a witness, but rather involve instances where the defen-
dant has decided to forego a full trial or a personal appearance
in court. The Court has held that where a defendant chooses
to enter a guilty plea, he waives the right to confront witnesses
against him5° if the record shows an effective waiver under the
classic standard.5 In order to ensure that a defendant is
knowingly waiving the right to confront, the judge may refuse
to accept the guilty plea until certain that the defendant
understands the full import of her decision. In addition, the
Court has held that under Zerbst the defendant's failure to
cross-examine a witness at the preliminary hearing was not a
waiver because the defendant did not know that the witness
would be absent at the trial or that the state would make no
effort to produce the witness at the trial.52
Rarely since Reynolds has the Court considered waiver of
confrontation rights operating through a defendant's mis-
conduct. The Court employed the Zerbst standard in Illinois v.
47. Id. at 158.
48. Id. at 160.
49. See Kirst, supra note 35, at 507.
50. E.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) ("A defendant who
enters [a guilty] plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including
his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a trial by jury and
his right to confront his accusers."). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
51. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
52. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
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Allen,53 holding that a defendant's disruptive conduct can
result in the waiver of the right to be present to confront
witnesses. In order to meet the "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment" requirement, the Court ruled that a trial judge
can remove an unruly defendant only after warning the defen-
dant that continued disruptions will result in removal.54 Only
once since Reynolds has the Court been presented with facts
where the defendant's misconduct led to the unavailability of
a witness. In Douglas v. Alabama55 the Court implied that
waiver of the confrontation right might operate through this
type of misconduct by the defendant and thereby allow the
prosecution's use of hearsay. It did not decide the issue,
however, because there was insufficient evidence to prove that
the defendant had acted improperly.56 As such, the Supreme
Court has never ruled on whether a prosecutor must show that
the defendant purposely made the declarant unavailable as a
witness in order to establish that the defendant has waived his
right to confrontation.
Lower federal and state courts have attempted to fill this
gap in the doctrine of waiver. There is general agreement
among courts that a defendant should not profit from her own
misconduct. To state this, however, is to state a conclusion
that avoids analyzing why certain acts should qualify as
misconduct for purposes of confrontation waiver. An examina-
tion of the particular facts in each of the cases in which waiver
has been alleged illustrates that the answer to the question of
how waiver should be defined is far from clear. In fact, many
times the question is not even addressed. It is uncertain
whether the standard for waiver by conduct differs from the
classic standard for waiver by intentional act, and if it does
differ, in what manner. If the misconduct is threatening or
killing a witness in order to prevent that witness's testimony
at trial, the classic standard of waiver can still be satisfied.
Yet courts have found waiver where the acts of the defendant
resulted in the unavailability of a witness even where such
unavailability seemed not to be the defendant's primary
intent. Examining the cases in which courts have found waiver
because of the defendant's misconduct is the first step to a
better understanding of the principles underlying the doctrine
53. 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
54. Id.
55. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
56. Id. at 417.
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of waiver of the confrontation right. Such an examination will
form the basis for fashioning a theory of waiver that attempts
to make some sense out of what courts have done in the past
and provide some guidance as to how such questions of waiver
might be analyzed in the future.
2. Procuring a Witness's Absence Through Murder or Threats
of Violence-It is possible for a defendant to waive the right to
confrontation by murdering a witness or threatening a witness
into not testifying. A number of cases have addressed the applica-
tion of waiver where the defendant has engaged in such explicit
misconduct. These cases, along with Reynolds and Allen, form
the doctrinal background against which courts have attempted
to address the issue of waiver by defendant misconduct. Courts
generally claim that in order for the defendant to have waived
the right to confrontation through murder or threat, two
requirements must be met. First, the defendant must have
committed the acts which caused the witness to be unavailable.5 7
Second, the defendant must have committed those acts for the
purpose of preventing the witness from testifying at trial.58
In United States v. Thevis,59 statements of a murdered wit-
ness were admitted under the federal residual hearsay excep-
tion for an unavailable declarant.6 ° The Fifth Circuit, in rather
broad language, held that a defendant who causes a witness's
unavailability for trial for the purpose of preventing that
witness from testifying waives the right to confrontation. The
court stated that while the right of confrontation was a funda-
mental one, the right was not absolute and; at times, had to
give way to a stronger state interest.61 Such a result was
57. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 n. 17 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 825 (1982). The government must prove these requirements by clear and
convincing evidence. Id.
58. Id.
59. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
60. Id. at 633; see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). This subsection reads, in part, as
follows:
(5) Other Exceptions
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
Id.
61. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 632.
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required, according to the court, when confrontation was made
impossible because of the actions of the person who was
asserting the right to confront.62
The court claimed it was applying the Zerbst standard in
finding that the defendant had waived his confrontation right.63
It reasoned that a defendant who caused a witness's absence
to prevent trial testimony "realizes that the witness is no
longer available and cannot be cross-examined."64 Since the
defendant operated under such an assumption, the court held
he could be found to have "intelligently and knowingly waived
his confrontation rights."65 In such a case, the court concluded,
"logic dictates that the right has been waived."66 To permit a
defendant to derive a benefit from murdering a witness against
him would "make a mockery of the system of justice that the
right was designed to protect."
6 7
United States v. Carlson68 also involved evidence sought to
be admitted under the federal residual hearsay exception for
an unavailable declarant. 69 The Eighth Circuit ruled that the
defendant's right to confrontation was invoked by the admis-
sion of grand jury testimony at trial, but did not analyze
whether the defendant had been afforded the right of confron-
tation. Instead, the court proceeded directly to a discussion of
waiver of the confrontation right and found that the defendant
had intimidated a witness, who had previously testified before
the grand jury, into not testifying.7" The court held that such
an action constituted a waiver of the right to confront.7'
62. Id. at 632-33.





68. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
69. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
70. Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1352-53. The witness stated "that he did not desire to
testify at trial because he feared reprisals." Id. at 1352. After a Drug Enforcement
Agency officer pointed out that the defendant had not harmed the witness after the
witness testified before the grand jury, the witness replied, " 'Yes, I know, but if I
don't testify at trial at least I'll have a chance. If I do, it will be over for me.'" Id. at
1352-53 (quoting witness). The agent then asked the witness if he realized that his
actions were confirming that the defendant had threatened him and the witness
responded, "I know. You have got the message." Id. at 1353 (quoting witness). When
asked if he thought the defendant would kill him if he were to testify, the witness
responded that "he did not want to have to find out." Id. (quoting witness). None-
theless, the witness reaffirmed that he had been truthful in his testimony before the
grand jury. Id.
71. Id. at 1358-60.
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Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit defined waiver
using the traditional Zerbst standard of an "intentional relin-
quishment of a known right."72 While the court stated that
Carlson did not explicitly manifest his consent to a waiver of
the confrontation right, such consent was not required if it
could be shown that the waiver was voluntary.7 3 One way to
accomplish this would be by killing the witness.74 But the court
made clear that the defendant need not go so far before it
would hold that the defendant waived the right to confront. If
the defendant "achieves his objective of silencing a witness by
less drastic, but equally effective, means," the defendant will
still be unable to claim the protection of the Sixth Amend-
ment. 5 In an often quoted passage the court stated that "[tihe
Sixth Amendment does not stand as a shield to protect the
accused from his own misconduct or chicanery. " "
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that admission of
hearsay evidence under-the federal residual hearsay exception
for an unavailable declarant 7 does not impinge on the right to
confront where a defendant threatens to kill a potential wit-
ness.v" By threatening a potential witness the defendant waives
his right to confrontation.7 9 Rather than invoking the federal
constitutional test of Zerbst, the court relied on the common
law principle that "one should not profit from his own wrong"
in concluding that "coercion can constitute voluntary waiver of
the right of confrontation." ° Use of such principles of common
law, often employed even in cases claiming to apply the Zerbst
test, forms a basis from which courts can broaden the defini-
tion of procuring the absence of a witness and thereby more
readily find that a defendant has waived the right to confront.
3. A Broader Definition of Procuring a Witness's
Unavailability-The Sixth Circuit, in Steele v. Taylor,8' held
that misconduct sufficient to establish a defendant's waiver of
72. Id. at 1358 (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464).
73. Id. at 1358, 1360.
74. Id. at 1359.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912)).
77. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
78. United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
840 (1980).
79. Id. at 630. The defendant's threat was quite explicit. He told the witness:
"Well, you know, we could get somebody killed if any statements were made regarding
the matter." Id. at 629 (quoting defendant).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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the right to confront is not limited to the use of force and
threats.8 2 Waiver also may be found through such actions as
"persuasion and control [of a witness] by a defendant, the
wrongful nondisclosure of information, and a defendant's
direction to a witness to exercise the fifth amendment privi-
lege."8 3 In Steele there was no direct evidence of specific threats
by the defendants. 4 There simply was evidence that the
defendants had attempted to conceal the crime and prevent the
testimony of the witness by obtaining a lawyer for her who
then advised her to refuse to testify and thereby place herself
in contempt.
8 5
The court advanced two possible rationales for its holding.
The first was a theory of implicit waiver of the right to con-
frontation. 6 In a footnote, however, the court noted that the
concept of waiver is not strictly applicable to cases where a
defendant has procured a witness's absence. In such cases, to
speak of a knowing, intelligent waiver is a mere legal fiction.
Rather, the defendant has engaged in misconduct that has
legal consequences which she may or may not foresee. "The
connection between the defendant's conduct and its legal
consequence under the confrontation clause is supplied by the
law and not by a purposeful decision by the defendant to forego
a known constitutional right."'
The reasoning the court ultimately offered was the common
law principle that the hearsay rule should be relaxed when the
defendant wrongfully causes the witness's unavailability, to
prevent the defendant from profiting from his own wrongdoing.
The court stressed the important "public policy [of] protecting
the integrity of the adversary process" and compared it to the
principle of reciprocity underlying the equitable doctrine of
"clean hands." 8 Under such a theory, while the law prefers live
testimony to hearsay, a defendant cannot profit from this
preference while at the same time repudiating it by creating
the condition that prevents the preference. 9
82. 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983).
83. Id. at 1201.
84. Id. at 1203.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1201.
87. Id. at 1201 n.8.
88. Id. at 1202.
89. Id.
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Both the Second and Eleventh Circuits have offered similarly
broad examples of what actions by a defendant may constitute
procurement of a witness's unavailability. In United States v.
Mastrangelo,90 the Second Circuit held that prior knowledge of
another's plan to murder a witness coupled with failure to
warn authorities was sufficient to constitute a waiver of the
right to confront.9'
The Eleventh Circuit addressed waiver of the right to con-
frontation in a case where the defendant shot and mortally
wounded a law enforcement agent as that agent and several
others were attempting to arrest him.92 At trial, the court
allowed the agent's supervisor to testify, under the federal
residual hearsay exceptions, to statements of the agent which
incriminated the defendant.93 Specifically, the statements
related to a meeting where a sale of drugs was negotiated. This
meeting took place approximately two weeks before the kill-
ing.94 The Eleventh Circuit held that the admission of this
testimony did not violate the defendant's confrontation right
because the defendant had "waived his right to cross-examine
[the agent] by killing him."95 The only support cited by the
court was Carlson's broad statement that the confrontation
right does not "protect the accused from his own misconduct
or chicanery."9 The court offered no further reasoning for its
holding that a defendant's action in committing a crime could
be used as proof that he had waived the right to confront.
Yet not all courts have found such a broad category of actions
sufficient to constitute waiver of the right to confrontation. In
a recent case dealing with the issue of waiver by misconduct, 97
90. 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
91. Id. at 14. At the trial, Chief Judge Weinstein stated:
It just is inconceivable.., that this radical step to aid Mastrangelo, who is the
only person that could have been helped by killing this witness, would have been
taken without his knowledge, acquiescence, or orders. And that, it seems to me,
is the clearest situation of a finding of manifest necessity that you can get.
United States v. Mastrangelo, 662 F.2d 946, 951 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting the lower
court's statement at argument), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982).
92. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 985 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1124 (1986).
93. Id. at 993.
94. Id. at 994.
95. Id. at 995.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977)).
97. United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618 (D.D.C. 1993).
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a federal trial court in Washington, D.C. held that "[miere
failure to prevent the murder, or mere participation in the
alleged drug conspiracy ... [is] insufficient to constitute
waiver."8 The court explicitly disagreed with the broad sweep
of the Second Circuit's holding in Mastrangelo. It reasoned that
to hold that a defendant's action in committing a crime consti-
tuted waiver would rob the Confrontation Clause of its pur-
pose.99
4. Patterns of Conduct as a Basis for Waiver-A few courts
have provided some guidance as to how meaning might be given
to the notion of a defendant exercising persuasion or control
over a witness. For example, the Eighth Circuit was able to
elaborate on its Carlson decision in the cases of Black v.
Woods'00 and Olson v. Green.'°' Both cases arose out of the
same murders of a woman and her two infant children. The
murders were committed by a woman named Link and a man
named Olson acting on orders of an inmate named Black. The
court found that Black had intimidated Link into not testifying,
thereby waiving his right to confront her. Moreover, this
intimidation went beyond specific threats regarding her testi-
mony at his trial for the murders; it included a "pattern of
conduct" where Black would physically abuse Link and threaten
to kill her if she did not obey his orders. °2 The court quoted
approvingly the Minnesota Supreme Court's language that
Black's involvement in the murder for which he was charged
was "'the most graphic and explicit threat possible.' "iO Such
evidence of prior threatening behavior toward the witness,
coupled with the defendant's order to commit the crime, were
sufficient to justify a finding of waiver.
Regarding a waiver by Olson, the Eighth Circuit found no
evidence in the record that indicated Black acted with Olson
or on Olson's behalf in threatening Link. As such, the threats
made by Black could not be attributed to Olson for the purpose
of finding that Olson had waived the right to confront Link.' 4
98. Id. at 623.
99. Id.
100. 651 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847 (1981).
101. 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982).
102. Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d at 531. For example, once the witness visited the
home of the victim but failed to kill her as Black had ordered. Black had a man beat
her and tell her that if she did not do what Black had asked, the man would "make
sure that his next trip was his last." State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208,214 (Minn. 1980).
103. Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d at 532 (quoting State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d at 214).
104. Olson, 668 F.2d at 429.
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The court rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning
that because the murdered woman, like Link, was a potential
witness, Olson's participation with Link in the murder was
itself a threat against Link. The court reasoned that Olson's
involvement in the murders was the issue at trial and his acts
there were directed at persons other than Link. Participation
in the commission of a crime is insufficient to waive the right
to confront and finding a waiver in such cases would destroy
the right to confrontation. "Involvement in the crime itself can
form the basis for waiver only if the evidence indicates that the
defendant directed the crime against the witness or otherwise
procured the witness' absence. " "'
In United States v. Papadakis, the Southern District of New
York employed an approach similar to that used in Black,
focusing on patterns of intimidation."6 In Papadakis the court
noted that the witness suffered a general fear for the safety of
himself and his family. This was due in part to the witness's
and defendant's intimate friendship and their membership in
a rather close community of former Greek nationals. This
created a background of mental anguish against which subse-
quent acts of intimidation had to be judged. °7 Thus, while the
defendant never explicitly threatened the witness with vio-
lence, his actions imploring the witness to leave the country
could nonetheless constitute waiver of the right to confront.
B. Burden of Proof for Finding Waiver by Misconduct
Once a court determines that it is possible for a defendant
to lose the right to confront through misconduct and attempts
to define what actions of a defendant will qualify as miscon-
duct, it must then delineate what standard of proof needs to
be met before waiver is found. Only one court, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, has required that the prosecution prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant procured the absence
105. Id. at 429-30.
106. 572 F. Supp. 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
107. Id. at 1524-25. The court stated that the defendant's threatening behavior
included the insistence that the witness leave the court's jurisdiction by going to
Greece and the defendant's offer to the witness of a quarter of a million dollars if he
returned to Greece. Id.
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of a witness. 0 8 In so doing, the court distinguished between the
reliability and the admissibility of evidence. A preponderance
of the evidence standard is sufficient for judicial determina-
tions of the admissibility of evidence under the exclusionary
rule, because the rule is meant to deter police misconduct and
normally does not relate to the reliability of evidence. 10 9
Waiver of the confrontation right is different, however. While
the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, it has
held that testing the reliability of evidence is one of the central
purposes behind the confrontation right."0 In cases where the
right is waived, admission of the hearsay statement is based
on the reliability of evidence of intimidation by the defendant.
The court's inquiry focuses on which manner of evidence, hear-
say or direct testimony, is more reliable. According to the Fifth
Circuit, the use of the clear and convincing standard is required
where admissibility hinges on constitutional requirements going
to the reliability of the evidence because the right of confronta-
tion is so integral to the accuracy of the fact-finding process and
the search for truth."' Furthermore, since the waiver of
constitutional rights is generally disfavored, requiring clear and
convincing evidence of intimidation ensures that close cases are
resolved in favor of the defendant." 2
Whatever the merits of this analysis, it has not found sup-
port in other cases. A number of courts have held that the
government need only prove that a defendant procured a wit-
ness's absence by a preponderance of the evidence."' The
108. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
825 (1982).
109. Id. at 631. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982)
(involving the murder of a key witness), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984) (citing
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d
1037, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)
(involving the voluntariness of a confession).
110. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
111. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 631; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240
(1967) (finding that the government must "establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect");
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273-74 (reviewing previous decisions and holding that a trial
judge should make findings under the clear and convincing standard).
112. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 633 n.17.
113. United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d
at 273; Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1053 (1983); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 624 (D.D.C. 1993);
State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (Kan. 1989); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1348
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); State v. Frambs, 460 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990).
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reason often cited for employing such a standard is that
"waiver by misconduct is an issue distinct from the underlying
right of confrontation."" 4 This point is illustrated by
analogizing waiver by misconduct to preliminary findings of
fact on the admissibility of extra-judicial statements under the
co-conspirator exception." 5 Questions of admissibility of co-
conspirator statements have been held to be equivalent to a
ruling on their admissibility under the Confrontation Clause
thereby requiring proof only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. "6 A preponderance of the evidence standard, therefore,
would seem sufficient for other extra-judicial statements such
as those used to make preliminary findings on procurement of
witness unavailability.
Courts also have reasoned that a preponderance of the
evidence standard protects the balance between a defendant's
right to confrontation and the public interest in ensuring that
a defendant does not profit from his own misconduct."' Too
high a burden of proof would tip the balance toward the
defendant, increasing the temptation for a defendant to abuse
the procedures meant to protect his constitutional rights."'
Furthermore, claims of waiver by misconduct are unlike
traditional waiver in that they are not disfavored by the law.
Courts have reasoned that threatening a witness is often
accompanied by tangible evidence such as the disappearance
or murder of a key witness. As such, these courts have found
that there is little reason to increase the burden of proof on the
prosecution. 9
C. Waiver of the Confrontation Right as Waiver
of Evidentiary Objections
Once a court determines that a defendant has waived the
right to confrontation, the question remains as to whether a
defendant still may challenge the evidence sought to be
114. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273.
115. Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202-03 (citing United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th
Cir. 1978)); White, 838 F. Supp. at 624 (citing United States v. Beckhan, 968 F.2d 47
(D.C. Cir. 1992)).
116. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700-01 (1974); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970).
117. White, 838 F. Supp. at 624.
118. Id.
119. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273.
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admitted under an evidentiary objection. A number of courts
have held that waiver of the right to confront is a fortiori a
waiver of the right to raise certain evidentiary exceptions. 2 °
While some courts have limited the waiver of evidentiary
objections to those involving hearsay, 121 it is not clear that
this is the limit to the scope of evidentiary objections waived
along with the confrontation right.'22
The reason courts most often provide for holding that a
waiver of the right to confront also operates as a waiver of any
hearsay objection is that the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rule function to protect similar values.' 23 Both seek to
guarantee accurate, reliable evidence. 124 While interests may
be balanced differently under each, the interests being weighed
do not change when one moves from the Confrontation Clause
to the hearsay rules. 125 Both seek to balance the state's interest
in acquiring relevant probative evidence against the defen-
dant's interest in testing the accuracy of that evidence. 126 Since
the defendant's interest in confrontation is the key interest
offsetting the need for evidence, once that interest is removed,
the balance necessarily favors the need for evidence.
127
Even if a court determines that hearsay objections are
waived along with the confrontation right, presumably the
hearsay statements must still be sufficiently reliable and their
probative value must outweigh their prejudicial impact, in
order to satisfy due process requirements. 128 It is not clear,
however, that these evidentiary concerns weigh heavily on
120. United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
121. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1053 (1983) (finding the statement admissible if the statement would have been
admissible had the witness testified); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630; White, 838 F. Supp. at
621.
122. See, e.g., Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 ("A defendant who procures a witness's
absence waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that
witness, not just to the admission of sworn hearsay statements."); United States v.
Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating that "[a] valid waiver of the
constitutional right [to confrontation] is a fortiori a valid waiver of an objection
under the rules of evidence."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
123. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 632 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
124. Roberts, 448 US. at 65-66.
125. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 632.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 632-33.
128. Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202 (holding that a statement is admissible against a
defendant who procured a witness's absence if the statement would have been
admissible had the witness testified); White, 838 F. Supp. at 625.
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courts once a finding of waiver has been established. 129 Once
again, the finding of waiver can simply function to affirm the
right in the abstract while robbing it of any value in the case
in which it is being applied. Waiver of the confrontation right
can become all the more attractive when it also may be used
to circumvent an analysis of whether certain evidentiary objec-
tions have been waived.
II. FASHIONING A THEORY OF WAIVER OF THE RIGHT
TO CONFRONTATION THROUGH A
DEFENDANT'S MISCONDUCT
The difficulty courts have experienced in formulating a
more precise notion of waiver has existed for some time. The
most well-known definition of waiver is usually attributed to
Johnson v. Zerbst,'30 a 1938 Supreme Court decision involv-
ing the waiver of the right to counsel. The Zerbst Court,
however, was simply restating the standard common law
definition of waiver, an "intentional relinquishment of a
known right."'' The primary difficulty involves explaining
how a waiver can be inferred from one's actions and still
meet the Zerbst requirement that the relinquishment be
intentional and the right be known. 32 As has been shown,
waiver of even a fundamental constitutional right such as
that of confrontation can be inferred from action. Yet such a
notion of waiver is inconsistent with the view that waiver is
an "intentional relinquishment of a known right."33 The
129. See, e.g., Balano, 618 F.2d at 626-27 (applying a theory of waiver in a
situation where a defendant, accused of being an accessory after the fact to the
interstate transportation of stolen goods, was held to have waived his right to
confrontation by threatening the life of a grand jury witness).
130. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
131. See, e.g., Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1, 5 (N.Y. 1908) (citing an "intentional
relinquishment of a known right"); Cowenhoven v. Ball, 23 N.E. 470, 471 (N.Y.
1890) (citing a "voluntary relinquishment of some right"); 2 HENRY M. HERMAN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA § 825, at 954 (1886) (citing
an "intentional relinquishment of a known right").
132. Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV.
478, 481 (1981).
133. Id. at 482 n.29. As Rubin points out, courts recognized this inconsistency
even before Zerbst's holding. Id. (citing United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 72
(1883); State v. Kaufman, 2 N.W. 275 (Iowa 1879)).
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analysis of waiver that follows examines how courts have
addressed or failed to address this apparent inconsistency.
As one commentator has stated, "[tihe key to any good
descriptive theory of waiver rules is a plausible view of the
purposes of the entitlements that may be waived." 34 One way
to define the purpose of an entitlement is to determine whom
the entitlement seeks to benefit and how it is to provide the
benefit. Such inquiries form a starting point for addressing the
issues at the heart of a finding of waiver operating through a
defendant's misconduct, namely "how rights can be taken away
and how they can be given up."
135
Under traditional analysis, one of the major benefits of
waiver is that it permits parties to minimize costs. A right is
not always beneficial to the person who possesses it, and
waivers allow persons "to reach informal agreements that avoid
the expense of asserting their rights."13 6 This rationale is
complicated in cases of waiver by misconduct. It is not immedi-
ately clear how waiver operating through misconduct fits into
this traditional analysis. The defendant is not making a
conscious, intelligent choice to avoid the expense of the proce-
dural rights of confrontation. While it is true that a defendant
who procures a witness's absence is trying to avoid the expense
of a procedural right, what he is trying to prevent is a witness's
testimony and not his own confrontation of that testimony.
Furthermore, the dangers presented by waiver are intimately
related to its benefits. While waiver presents an alternative to
the costs of the formal decision-making process, it also func-
tions as an alternative to the protection that such formal
procedures involve. Once waiver of a right is possible, the
ability of one party effectively to assert that a right has been
waived may leave a weaker party in the same position as if
that party never possessed the right in the first place. 37 Such
dangers are magnified in cases of a defendant's misconduct
when waiver often operates not by a knowing, intelligent choice
of a .defendant, but instead through the use of a legal fiction.
The incentive to avoid the complex and lengthy Confrontation
Clause analysis that many waiver cases otherwise would entail
134. William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761,
769 (1989).
135. Rubin, supra note 132, at 483. Rubin sees the latter question as the focal
point for examining the law of waiver. Id.
136. Id. at 488.
137. Id. at 490.
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is an excellent example of both the costs to be avoided by
asserting waiver and the temptations that can lead to a hasty
finding of waiver.
The pervasive use of waiver to justify the loss of procedural
rights, including the right to confrontation, has resulted in a
doctrine notable mostly for its flexibility and vagueness. The
unclear standards which current waiver theory employs permit
courts to use waiver to justify a large number of failures to
follow constitutionally required procedures. The undisciplined
use of waiver has enabled courts to affirm certain procedural
rights in the abstract while avoiding the costs that such rights
would impose in particular instances.13 This results, in large
part, from the unwillingness of courts to address these difficult
issues head-on. Instead, courts rely on waiver to reach a
desired result while avoiding a comprehensive examination of
the implications of their actions. The remainder of this Part
explores possible theoretical explanations for the actions that
courts have taken in finding waiver through a defendant's
misconduct and how the assumptions underlying courts' actions
might be analyzed more explicitly.
A. Waiver versus Forfeiture
Distinguishing between waiver and forfeiture is one way to
attempt to explain the difference between the requirements of
the classic standard of waiver and the courts' practice of
finding waiver in cases where a defendant causes a witness's
unavailability. This distinction can be made by separating from
traditional waiver analysis questions regarding whether a
procedural right should be defined so as to be available to the
defendant and whether the defendant could be regarded as
having utilized the proper means of implementing such a right.
Only a conscious choice to forego the exercise of a separately
defined right would be properly considered a waiver.'39 Ques-
tions regarding the scope of a particular right and the proce-
dures that a defendant must use to reap the benefits of that
right would be evaluated under the rubric of forfeiture. 4 °
138. See George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 194-95 (1977).
139. Id. at 196.
140. Id.
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Under such a formulation, forfeiture differs from waiver in that
a defendant can forfeit a right without ever making a deliber-
ate and informed decision to relinquish that right.'4 ' Reliance
on waiver concepts in instances where a defendant has intimi-
dated a witness into not testifying obscures the conceptual and
theoretical bases which guide a court in reaching a given
outcome.
Professor Westen examines the context of guilty pleas to
develop a theory of forfeiture of constitutional defenses that
more directly addresses the scope of the right in question and
the procedures required for the right to be exercised. 142 His
approach focuses on the overriding interests of the state and
the balance between those interests and the interests of an
individual defendant.'43 In the case of constitutional defenses
in criminal procedure, the balance is between "the interest of
the defendant in asserting the values protected by the partic-
ular constitutional defense at issue [and] the interest of the
state in preserving its opportunity to obtain a conviction at
trial."44 A claim of waiver by the prosecution will be invali-
dated where it "places the state in no worse a position with
respect to its ability to obtain a valid conviction against the
defendant ... than it occupied before entry of the plea." 45 In
other words, the prosecution must show that "it relied to its
detriment" on the defendant's waiver.'46 This analysis creates
a distinction focusing on rights that are outweighed by a state
interest and those that are not because they do not conflict
with any interest. 147 One must identify the nature of both the
state's and the defendant's interests and strike a balance
between the two by considering the alternative methods to
achieve the goals that each interest is designed to promote. 48
141. Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitu-
tional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (1977).
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 1238.
145. Id. at 1235.
146. Id. at 1237. For example, the prosecution cannot claim to have relied upon
a defendant's waiver (a guilty plea) in cases of incurable errors because those errors
invalidated the state's case from the beginning; the defendant's waiver does not
operate to put the state in any worse of a position than it occupied before that waiver.
As regards a curable guilty plea, however, the state can argue that had the error been
brought to its attention before it relied on the error, it could have cured the error and
not lost the opportunity to gather and present a successful case. Id.
147. Id. at 1238-39.
148. Id. at 1239.
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This forfeiture analysis is especially helpful in elucidating
the rationale behind one area where a defendant may lose
rights through misconduct-behavior in the courtroom. In
Illinois v. Allen,'49 the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant
had waived his right to be present in the courtroom because
of his misconduct.150 Despite his disruptive actions, the defen-
dant insisted throughout the proceeding that he wished to
remain in the courtroom. As with cases of misconduct consist-
ing of threats to witnesses, it is difficult to explain the holding
in Allen by relying on traditional notions of waiver."' The right
was not lost through the consent of the defendant, but the
Court did not provide guidance on how to determine when a
nonconsensual loss of a constitutional right was justified. In
effect, the Court in Allen converted waiver into a punitive
sanction but applied the Zerbst standard to avoid setting down
any new rules or standards. 15 2 Using a forfeiture analysis to
balance the rights of the defendant against the rights of the
state, it is possible to conclude that the defendant's constitu-
tional right to be present in the courtroom was outweighed by
the state's interest in being able to conduct the trial in an
orderly manner.153 Such a conclusion is reached, however,
through a more precise analysis of the right in question and
the manner in which it must be exercised.
By separating forfeiture from waiver analysis it becomes
apparent that the controlling factor in waiver of the confron-
tation right through misconduct "is not the defendant's state
of mind, but the effect his decision has on the interests of the
state."'54 Thus, waiver functions as "a doctrine that defines the
outer limits of constitutional rights"' 55-the area past which an
individual's interests are outweighed by the state's. This has
severe implications, for it means that the state must provide
"a legitimate and persuasive reason for limiting [a defendant's]
constitutional defenses"'56 instead of merely relying on the
149. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
150. Id. at 343.
151. See Tigar, supra note 5, at 11; Westen, supra note 141, at 1239 n.50.
152. Tigar, supra note 5, at 11.
153. Of course this raises questions about how to define orderly courtroom proce-
dures and to what extent such procedures further certain state interests. Neverthe-
less, exploration of these questions more directly addresses the implications of
removing defendants from courtrooms as a result of their misconduct.
154. Westen, supra note 141, at 1260.
155. Id. at 1261.
156. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir.
1981).
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notion that because the defendant has engaged in misconduct
he has made a decision not to assert his constitutional right.
157
Distinguishing between forfeiture and waiver may force courts
to examine the interests underlying both the defendant's and
the state's position and allow more thorough and thoughtful
resolutions of cases where the defendant has engaged in
misconduct.
B. Unworthy Defendants and Intended Beneficiaries
One legitimate and persuasive reason for holding that a
defendant may not claim the protection of a certain right is
that the defendant is not part of the class of persons that the
right is intended to benefit. Such a view of waiver operates on
the assumption that certain rights are intended to protect third
parties and not the interests of the defendant who is asserting
them.'58 This notion rings most true in Fourth Amendment
search and seizure doctrine, where the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that the defendants who claim the amend-
ment's protection are not its intended beneficiaries. Rather,
defendants are able to exclude inculpatory evidence in order
to deter police from invading the privacy of innocent third
parties.159 Many other constitutional protections can be seen
as extending to the guilty "primarily as a means of protecting
the innocent."6 '
A theory that centers on determining the intended benefi-
ciary of a right can be used to explain the differing approaches
courts take to waiver of constitutional rights. Where the right
is one that protects only the person asserting that right, courts
employ a protective waiver doctrine such as that advanced by
Zerbst. Such a doctrine aims to protect the interests of a
defendant asserting the right by ensuring that the defendant
understands the consequences of relinquishing that right.
157. Westen, supra note 141, at 1261.
158. Stuntz, supra note 134, at 765.
159. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 486-89 (1976). For a general discussion of the Fourth Amendment's
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, see Arnold H. Loewy, The
Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229
(1983).
160. Stuntz, supra note 134, at 766.
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Hence, the traditional Zerbst standard demands (1) that the
waiver be knowing and intentional, and (2) that there exists
a heavy presumption against waiver.' 6 ' The Zerbst standard,
then, apparently requires a theory of waiver that is designed
generally to advance the interests of the waiving party.
162
This, however, is not the only permissible view of waiver.
Certain rights may be construed to protect persons other than
the class that is claiming their protection in criminal cases or
to protect all rightholders from some narrow kind of harm.
6 3
These rights, although asserted by the defendant, protect
something other than the defendant's rational self-interest,
namely the rights of third parties.' 64 In these cases waiver will
be allowed only to protect third party beneficiaries' interests. 65
In such circumstances, the central task of waiver analysis is
to distinguish "unworthy" defendants from the intended benefi-
ciaries of those rights where such differentiation is possible.
Employing this reasoning, a waiver doctrine that tends to
produce waivers from defendants guilty of witness intimidation
but not from defendants innocent of such intimidation might
be acceptable or even desirable. 166 The goal of a certain waiver
regime then may be seen as developing procedures able to
effectively differentiate between guilty and innocent holders of
a certain right.
Under such a view, waiver rules would permit and perhaps
even encourage the state to take advantage of a defendant's
misconduct in intimidating a witness, because a person who
engages in such misconduct is not the intended beneficiary of
the Sixth Amendment right to confront. Yet to allow the state
to act in such a way, courts must insure that there is a high
correlation between those defendants who a court determines
to be unintended beneficiaries of the confrontation right and
those defendants who actually have threatened a witness into
not testifying. One way to accomplish this would be to require
the state to offer legitimate and persuasive reasons when it
seeks waiver of the right to confront. Such a requirement,
161. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
162. Stuntz, supra note 134, at 777.
163. For example, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can
be seen as protecting rightholders against the specific harm caused by police abuse
during interrogation. See id. at 840.
164. Id. at 784.
165. Id. at 779.
166. Id. at 781.
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perhaps implemented through a higher burden of proof, would
insure that due process protection was strictly applied to any
attempt to differentiate between guilty and innocent right-
holders.
C. Waiver as a Functional Equivalent of Due Process
In the case of waiver of confrontation rights by misconduct,
courts often have applied a less demanding standard of waiver
than the traditional Zerbst standard used in other areas of
criminal procedure.'67 Under the traditional test, a court will
judge the validity of a waiver in two ways: (1) the right alleged
to have been waived must be known by the defendant and
(2) the relinquishment of that right must be intentional, that
is, voluntary and without compulsion.'68 In cases of defendant
misconduct, waiver must still be intentional, but the defendant
need not have known of the right that she was waiving. In-
stead, the right to confrontation may be waived by an action
inconsistent with the exercise of the right in question.'69 In
deciding whether a defendant voluntarily intended to waive a
right, courts traditionally have judged voluntariness through
a "totality of the circumstances" approach. 70 Such a standard,
however, has resulted in the possible inclusion of almost
anything as relevant to the inquiry of voluntariness while
providing little guidance on the relative weight to be given to
167. The strict standard for waiver was applied in the Zerbst case itself dealing
with the right to counsel and was applied to other contexts in subsequent decisions.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969) (right to trial); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (right to trial by
jury); Turner v. United States, 325 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.) (right to formal indictment
before trial), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
168. Rubin, supra note 132, at 491. The knowledge requirement can be satisfied
either subjectively, where the defendant must have actual knowledge of the right
being given up, or objectively, where a reasonable person in such circumstances would
be aware that such an action constituted waiver. Intent is a more complicated concept,
involving both the notion of voluntariness and knowledge. To be voluntary, the waiver
must not be the product of compulsion. Like knowledge, intent can be judged either
subjectively or objectively. Id. at 492-93.
169. Similarly, a criminal defendant may waive the right to raise objections of
defenses by failing to do so at the appropriate time, regardless of whether the
defendant has knowledge of the right. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f); Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (failure to object); United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (failure to raise defenses); Rubin, supra note 132, at 496-97.
170. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
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different factors. 17 ' This piecemeal analysis allows courts to
conclude that a waiver was voluntary without addressing, in
any focused manner, the significance of that finding to the
exercise or definition of the right in question.
Courts also employ different measures of intent, which result
in further distinction between the traditional standard for
waiver and the less demanding standard often used in cases
of defendant misconduct. Under the traditional test, a judge
will employ a subjective standard and examine the defendant's
state of mind to ensure that he is aware of his rights and
waives them voluntarily. Under the approach most often used
in cases of waiver by procurement of a witness's absence,
judges employ an objective method of proof to justify a finding
of waiver. Using such an objective approach, a judge can hold
a defendant to have waived the right to confront even if the
accused did not know that her threats to the witness constitut-
ed waiver of that right. While such a result may be merited,
no court has provided a general rule for distinguishing between
these differing standards of waiver. 72
This contrast between the objective and subjective standards
of intent points to a distinction that can easily be obscured in
cases of indirect waiver through misconduct: the difference
between the loss of rights through waiver and the loss of rights
by adjudication. It is possible to classify waiver by misconduct
as waiver by inconsistent action. Such classification supports
the notion that traditional waiver analysis is sufficient in the
case of defendant misconduct because the defendant has taken
an action directly related to the right, and his action supports
the conclusion that he has decided not to assert the right.
Thus, the loss of the right can be classified as waiver. At the
same time, however, in cases of waiver by misconduct the
connection between the defendant's action and its legal conse-
quence often is supplied by the court during the adjudicatory
process. Thus, the loss of the right can be classified as occur-
ring through adjudication.
In order to preserve the distinction between loss of rights
through waiver and loss of rights through adjudication, one
could require that waiver result from a decision that is directly
related to the right in question and that waiver require a
171. Dix, supra note 138, at 200.
172. See Rubin, supra note 132, at 497-98. Furthermore, commentators generally
have not viewed the absence of such a general rule as worthy of much concern. See
id. at 498.
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judicial determination that the defendant's misconduct consti-
tutes a decision not to assert that right. If one is to define
waiver in this way, that is, in relation to the right in question,
then waiver can only occur during the process in which the
right is being asserted.'73 Use of this standard will prevent
findings of waiver in situations where the connection between
the defendant's misconduct and its legal consequence was
supplied by the trial judge. This, in turn, prevents judges from
using waiver to avoid addressing the issue of whether their
decisions to deprive defendants .of the right 'to confrontation
violate standards of due process.
174
One way to construct the approach described above is to
employ what one commentator has labeled a "functional
equivalent of due process.",7 5 Under a functional equivalent
approach, a waiving party receives "the functional equivalent
of due process protection if his waiver reaches the type of
result that a court could have reached had the issue been
submitted to it for adjudication." 76 To ensure that this occurs,
a court must determine the nature of the right being waived,
the protection afforded by that right, and that the substituted
proceedings utilizing defendant's waiver provide the same due
process protection as a full hearing. Since waiver is a method
of structuring relationships between individuals in legally
significant actions, particularly between the party who waives
the right and the party who obtains that waiver and relies
upon it, waiver cannot eliminate the rights of a defendant, but
can only alter their form.'77 The key element to be considered
is the "degree of equivalence between the result of the waiver
and the plenary adjudication." 78
The difficulty with such an approach is that it largely fails
to consider threats which occur outside of the adjudicatory
173. Id. at 484-86.
174. Id. at 486.
175. Id. at 539.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 536-37.
178. Id. at 540. The question then becomes whether the waiver changes the basic
structure of the trial or, rather, represents a choice within the context of an ongoing
trial. Professor Rubin's examples of when the more lenient standard would be
applicable include cases where the defendant "is tried in a district distant from the
one where the crime occurred, fails to appear at a trial, fails to raise a defense or
objection, or testifies on his own behalf." Id. at 546-47. Waivers which alter the basic
structure of the trial would include waiver of a jury trial, waiver of counsel, and
waiver of the right to 'a trial through a plea of guilty. Id.
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process, but which are nonetheless meant to effect that process.
Often a defendant will realize long before formal proceedings
have commenced that testimony by a certain witness may have
devastating results. There may be good reason for limiting a
defendant's right to confrontation because of actions to prevent
a witness from testifying even before the beginning of formal
proceedings. Nevertheless, the procedure for limiting a defen-
dant's confrontation right in such a way must be carefully
constructed to ensure that the defendant's due process rights
are not violated.
D. Synthesizing a Theory of Waiver
Each of the theories that this Note has examined supports
the conclusion that the controlling factor in a court's analysis
of waiver of the confrontation right due to a defendant's
misconduct is not the defendant's state of mind, but rather the
interests of the state and the manner in which those interests
interfere with the defendant's rights. As such, the traditional
standard for determining waiver formulated in Johnson v.
Zerbst-an intentional relinquishment of a known right-is of
little help. A determination of waiver should not be made using
undefined notions of a voluntary relinquishment of a known
right, but rather should focus on the degree of equity between
the result to be reached by finding waiver and the result to be
reached through adjudication had the witness testified. Waiver
should only be employed where both its underlying rationale
and the impact of its use have been carefully analyzed. To
accomplish this, courts must address how the defendant's
actions affect the availability of the witness and hence, how
they impact the defendant's due process rights.
The type of interest balancing inherent in such an approach
to waiver is vulnerable to a criticism leveled against more
traditional formulations of waiver, namely that courts are
hostile to certain constitutional rights of criminal procedure,
but are unwilling to admit that hostility. Instead, courts create
broad classes of rights but allow those rights to be waived
relatively easily.'79 A court may make a conclusory appeal to
179. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,655-60 (1984) (justifying a public
safety exception to Miranda in terms of interest-balancing); see also Charles J.
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interest-balancing as easily as it makes a finding of waiver. 8 '
Courts would be able to challenge such a critique through
implementation of the steps outlined in the preceding analysis.
First, courts must acknowledge that waiver of the confrontation
right through misconduct is a legal fiction. The connection
between the defendant's actions in threatening a witness and
the loss of the confrontation right is provided by a court and
justified by the interests of the state, regardless of whether the
defendant made a deliberate and informed decision to relin-
quish the right. Second, courts must insist on a high degree of
accuracy in any attempt to segregate those who are intended
beneficiaries of the confrontation right from those who, by
virtue of their actions in intimidating a witness, are not
intended beneficiaries of the right. This can be accomplished
by requiring the state to provide legitimate and persuasive
reasons when it seeks a waiver of the right to confront. Finally,
even after a defendant has been held to have waived the right
to confront, courts must ensure that he receives due process in
the form of the functional equivalent of the trial that he would
have received had the witness testified.
III. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF WAIVER OF THE
CONFRONTATION RIGHT THROUGH MISCONDUCT TO
CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Child sexual abuse cases present unique problems for the
rules of evidence regarding hearsay; problems that stem from
the conflict between the rights of the child witness and those
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1826, 1839-42 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court's use of a
balancing test instead of bright line rules has resulted in a defendant's interest being
undervalued vis-a-vis those of the state); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and
the Police: IndividualRights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 19-21 (1988)
(stating that the Supreme Court's balancing process is biased in favor of the state);
Stuntz, supra note 134, at 783 (noting that interest balancing allows the Supreme
Court to be hostile to individual rights without justifying that hostility).
180. See generally T. Alex Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 1002-04 (1987) (discussing potential alternatives to balancing,
including focused examination of items such as text, structure, precedent, con-
sequences, history, intent, and notions of fundamental values).
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of the accused. Such tension between the rights of the child
witness and the accused provides a useful forum in which to
test a theory of waiver.
Statements of a nontestifying witness which the prosecution
seeks to admit must meet both the necessity and reliability
requirements for admitting hearsay. It is necessary to admit
children's hearsay statements in cases of sexual abuse because,
in many cases, this is the only evidence that the crime occur-
red. There are often no witnesses other than the perpetrator,
since this person is likely to be close to the child and have
opportunity to be alone with the child. In addition, physical
evidence is rare both because of the nonviolent nature of many
of the offenses and the delay in reporting or visiting a doctor.'1
8
Finally, a child's memory tends to fade quickly, making the
account given closest to the event the most reliable.8 2 The
question of the reliability of children's out-of-court statements
has provoked much controversy. Some commentators have
argued that it is unlikely children will consistently lie to
authority figures about sexual abuse and that regardless,
children do not have enough information about sexual matters
to construct effective lies.8 3 Others have pointed out that
children have a tendency to tell stories and are susceptible to
suggestion; hence their statements cannot be held reliable
without further investigation.' 84 Neither experts nor empirical
data agree about the emotional consequences of testifying in
court on a child witness.
8 5
181. See Schwalb, supra note 13.
182. See Yun, supra note 19, at 1750.
183. See Roland Summit, M.D., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,
7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983); Yun, supra note 19, at 1751.
184. See WEXLER, supra note 14, at 300-02; Mary Ann King & John Yuille, Sug-
gestibility and the Child Witness, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 24 (S. Ceci et al.
eds., 1987) (finding that historically, legal authorities distrusted the testimony of
children because of their inability to distinguish fact from fiction); Cockburn, supra
note 14, at 190-91 (1990) (criticizing the admission of testimony by two-year old
children in sexual abuse cases without physical evidence or corroboration by adults);
Coleman & Clancy, supra note 14, at 17-19 (claiming that children are prone to
"suggestibility" because of their "intellectual and emotional immaturity and depen-
dence on adults").
185. Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Note, Children as Witnesses After Maryland v.
Craig, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 2005 (1992).
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A. Traditional Methods of Introducing Hearsay in
Cases of Child Sexual Abuse
Hearsay evidence in child sexual abuse cases often is admit-
ted under the excited utterance exception, the hearsay excep-
tion for medical diagnosis or treatment, or a residual hearsay
exception.' Individual states also have adopted statutes to
address the problem of children testifying in an adversarial
setting in which procedures are designed by adults to protect
adults. This section briefly explores the difficulties of each of
these traditional approaches, and attempts to apply the theory
of waiver of the confrontation right which was developed in
Part II to cases of child sexual abuse. In so doing, it highlights
both the benefits and potential dangers that can result from
applying such a theory of waiver in the context of child sexual
abuse. What is gleaned from the application of waiver in the
context of child sexual abuse may then be used to inform the
theory of waiver which was developed in Part II.
1. Hearsay Exceptions for Excited Utterances and for State-
ments Made in the Course of Receiving Medical Care-The
hearsay exception for excited utterances. 7 often has been used
by prosecutors in attempts to have a child's hearsay statements
admitted into evidence.' The exception has three require-
ments. First, there must be a startling occurrence that pro-
duces shock in the declarant. Second, the statement must be
made before the declarant is able to reflect upon it. Third, the
statement must be related to the startling event. The primary
justification for this exception is that the startling event
produces a shock in the declarant that prevents "reasoned
reflection" or fabrication.8 9 The statement is thought to be
186. Most states pattern their rules of evidence on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
187. FED. R. EVID. 803. The rule states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(2) Excited utterance
A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
Id.
188. Yun, supra note 19, at 1753.
189. See generally 2 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 272 (John W. Strong ed., 1992)
(summarizing the bases of the "spontaneous statements" exception and applying it
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reliable even though it is hearsay because the declarant is in
a state where it is unlikely he will distort the information. 9 '
The hearsay exception for statements made during the course
of medical treatment' 9' also is used by prosecutors to admit a
child's hearsay statements. 92 The rationale for admitting such
statements is based on the belief that persons making state-
ments to a doctor are unlikely to lie.'93
The Supreme Court in White v. Illinois194 went a long way
toward increasing the attractiveness to prosecutors of the
excited utterance and the -medical diagnosis hearsay excep-
tions. The Court held that the two exceptions were well
established and satisfied the evidentiary requirements for
admission. Therefore, statements introduced under one of these
two exceptions per se meet the requirements of the Confronta-
tion Clause. In addition, the Court held that the prosecution
did not have to show that the declarant was unavailable to
testify before such hearsay evidence could be admitted.
In their zealousness to convict perpetrators of child sexual
abuse, prosecutors have argued for, and judges often have
indulged in, an extension of the excited utterance and medical
diagnosis exceptions. For example, judges have admitted
hearsay statements .made days after the alleged event oc-
curred under the rubric of the excited utterance.'9 5 Fitting the
to sexual abuse cases); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1747 (Chadbourn rev. 1961) (describing
how external events can sufficiently surprise individuals so that their statements are
particularly trustworthy).
190. See Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116, 120 (7th Cir. 1985).
191. FED. R. EVID. 803. The rule states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar
as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
Id.
192. See Myrna S. Raeder, White's Effect on the Right to Confront One's Accuser,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 1993, at 2, 54.
193. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257, 257 (1989).
194. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
195. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 337 S.E.2d 833, 841-43 (N.C. 1985) (employing a
"broad and liberal" interpretation of the excited utterance exception when applied to
young children); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 158-59 (S.D. 1985) (holding that
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testimony of victims of child sexual abuse into traditional
hearsay exceptions, therefore, often involves a strained inter-
pretation of those exceptions.' 96 White encourages such action
by allowing prosecutors to evaluate whether a child's hearsay
statements are sufficient to obtain a conviction without justify-
ing the child's absence from trial.
Prosecutors also experience difficulties when relying on the
excited utterance doctrine. The requirement of spontaneity
and limits on the lapse of time make it difficult to admit many
child hearsay statements, even in courts that interpret eviden-
tiary rules favorably to the prosecution. 9 ' Further, mere
expansion of judicial discretion does not address the problem
of an excited utterance doctrine that may not take into ac-
count the different psychological and behavioral patterns of
children.198
The use of the medical treatment exception may be limited
because some states have not liberalized their rules for such
hearsay to the extent of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
traditional exception was limited to statements of present or
past symptoms.199 The current federal rule allows statements
relating to medical history and the condition's causation. 00 In
addition, it is not clear whether the rule encompasses children
who are too young to understand the importance of providing
a doctor with accurate information.201 A number of states have
barred statements made by children during the course of
medical treatment where it was shown that the child did not
understand the importance of being truthful with a doctor. 0 2
a mere lapse of time alone does not disqualify a child's hearsay statement as an
excited utterance).
196. See Mike McGrath & Carolyn Clemens, The Child Victim as a Witness in
Sexual Abuse Cases, 46 MONT. L. REv. 229, 234-35 (1985).
197. JoEllen S. McComb, Comment, Unavailability and Admissibility: Are a
Child's Out-of-Court Statements About Sexual Abuse Admissible if the Child Does Not
Testify at Trial?, 76 KY. L.J. 531, 557 (1987-1988).
198. Yun, supra note 19, at 1755 (explaining that the excited utterance exception
treats children as if they were adults because it is premised on the psychology,
behavior, and experience of adults and assumes children will react in the same
manner as adults).
199. Raeder, supra note 192, at 54.
200. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
201. Raeder, supra note 192, at 54.
202. See, e.g., People v. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Mich. 1992) (holding that
a four-year-old victim of sexual abuse did not fully understand the need to speak
truthfully); W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 181 & n.8 (Colo. 1984) (finding that
statement by four year old victim to physician, not for purposes of medical treatment,
but rather as a step in law enforcement proceedings, was not admissible under the
hearsay exception).
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2. Residual Hearsay Exceptions and State Statutory
Exceptions-At times it is possible for a child's hearsay state-
ment to be admitted under a residual exception to the hearsay
rule.2 °3 Statements admitted under one of the residual exceptions
must possess the same "circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness" as a statement "admitted under one of the tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions."2 °4 The residual exceptions set out
five requirements for the admission of hearsay-trustworthiness,
materiality, probativeness, satisfaction of the interests ofjustice,
and notice to the adverse party.205 The residual exceptions have
resulted in expanded judicial discretion but have provided no
firm guidance for judges to rely on in exercising that discre-
tion.20 6 For example, some commentators have argued that the
criteria established by the rules are overly formalistic and that
the courts are justified in reading the requirements rather
broadly.20 7 Others have criticized what they perceive to be the
courts' distortion of the residual exceptions to provide trial
judges with broad discretion as to a statement's admissibility.
20 8
In addition to general hearsay exceptions, a number of states
have enacted statutes dealing specifically with the prosecution
of child sexual abuse. 209 Like the residual exceptions, hearsay
203. See, e.g., United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1443-46 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that hearsay testimony by the foster mother of a child's statements was
admissible under FED. R. EVID. 803(24)).
204. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation
Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the
Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 531 (1988).
205. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
206. See generally Thomas Black, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 804(b)(5)--The
Residual Exceptions-An Overview, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 13 (1988) (examining opinions
of federal courts applying the residual exceptions and analyzing whether any patterns
have emerged in the application of the exceptions).
207. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1978) (maintaining that
the residual exception should not be limited to hearsay statements of extremely high
probative value); Glen Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual
Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 8 (1984) (arguing that the residual exceptions are too
strict for sexual abuse cases); Ray Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 587 (1980) (claiming that residual
exceptions should create a broad exception to the hearsay rule); Joseph W. Rand, Note,
The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: The Futile and Misguided Attempt
to Restrain Judicial Discretion, 80 GEO. L.J. 873, 873-74 (1992) (arguing that Congress
was mistaken in its desire, articulated in the residual exceptions, to limit the common
law discretion of judges).
208. See, e.g., David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay
Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982) (arguing that
courts have been inconsistent in interpreting and applying the residual exceptions).
209. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (1993) (providing an exception where the
declarant is under 10 years old, the circumstances surrounding the statement indicate
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admitted under these statutory exceptions for child sexual
abuse must posses circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness equivalent to hearsay statements admitted under tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions.21 ° The Supreme Court has identified
a number of factors which, while not exclusive, should be
considered in determining whether a child's hearsay statement
is reliable. Such factors include spontaneity and consistent
reliability, additional evidence is introduced to corroborate the statement, and the
child either testifies at the grand jury proceeding or is available to testify at trial);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1993) (statement by a child under 10 years old which
describes sexual abuse is admissible if court finds the content of the statement and
the circumstances surrounding the statement reasonable and the child testifies at trial
or before a grand jury); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1994) (statements by a
child under age 12 which describe sexual abuse are admissible where law enforcement
officials or county welfare employees include the child's statements in their written
reports, the child makes the statement before the defendant's confession which is
memorialized by a law enforcement officer, the child is unavailable to testify, and
other circumstances are present which indicate reliability); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16
(Michie 1993) (statement by child under 14 about any sexual contact or physical abuse
is admissible through testimony of person with whom the child discussed the
incident(s) where the court finds sufficient indicia of reliablity); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/115-10 (1994) (for prosecutions of perpetrators of sexual acts on children under 13
years old, admissible evidence includes the child's testimony or out of court statements
about the act or any element of the offense for which the defendant is being prosecut-
ed, where the court finds evidence of reliability, and the child either testifies or there
is evidence corroborating the child's statement); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5986
(Purdon 1994) (a child's statement regarding sexual abuse which is not otherwise
admissible is admissible in a dependency proceeding if the court finds the content and
circumstances reliable); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. ANN. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 1994)
(statements about general abuse by a child under 12 years old is admissible through
testimony of first adult to whom the child made such statements where the court finds
indicia of trustworthiness and where the child testifies); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1993) (statement by child under 10 years old which describes
sexual abuse is admissible if court finds content and circumstances reliable). The
Washington statute was the first to be implemented and served as the model for many
other states. Its constitutionality was upheld in State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash.
1984). For a discussion of these and other similar statutes, see Paula S. Coons, Note,
The Revision of Article 38.071 After Long v. State: The Troubles of a Child Shield Law
in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 267 (1988); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex
Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1985); Yun,
supra note 19.
210. See generally Sheryl K. Peterson, Comment, Sexual Abuse of Chil-
dren-Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813 (1983) (discussing
Washington's hearsay exception which applies in criminal prosecutions for sexual
abuse of children). Peterson states that in determining the reliability of a child's
hearsay statement courts should consider the time lapse between the alleged act and
the child's report of that act, "whether the statement was made in response to a
leading question," whether either the witness or the declarant had any bias against
the defendant, whether the statement was made while the child was upset, whether
the language used by the child was likely to be that used by a child of a similar age,
and whether any event which occurred between the alleged abuse and the child's
statement could have accounted for the contents of the statement. Id. at 827.
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repetition, the mental state of the declarant, the use of termi-
nology unexpected of a child of the declarant's age, and the
lack of a motive to lie.211
As with the traditional hearsay exceptions, prosecutors often
are able to admit initial, spontaneous statements regarding
sexual contact under these state statutes. Statements later
made to police or social workers usually are not admitted,
however, because they lack the required circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. This is because such statements
generally are given during the course of investigative inter-
views where the interviewer has knowledge of the child's
previous incriminating statements and may ask leading or
suggestive questions.212 A further difficulty arises from the
prohibition of using after-the-fact corroboration of the child's
statement in determining its reliability.213 Thus, it is not clear
whether these statutes specifically addressing child sexual
abuse provide a greater level of procedural protection to either
the defendant or his alleged victim.
B. Application of Waiver to Child Sexual Abuse Cases
1. Loss of the Right to Confront a Child Witness-An
alternative to the traditional methods of admitting hearsay
statements of child witnesses in cases of sexual abuse is to
establish that the defendant has waived the right of confronta-
tion. This alternative has not been explored to any great
extent, however, largely due to the courts' hostility to such
waiver arguments on the rare occasion that they are raised in
the context of child abuse. This hostility often is based on a
distinction courts employ in child sexual abuse cases between
threats made during the commission of a crime and those made
after judicial proceedings have commenced. Only threats made
after formal proceedings have begun may properly be consid-
ered in determining waiver. Finding an implied waiver through
threats uttered during the commission of the crime or before
ajudication would rob the Confrontation Clause of much of its
211. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990) (citations omitted).
212. Graham, supra note 204, at 537.
213. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821; see also Dripps, supra note 25,. at 11 (stating that
the use of corroborating statements allows "bootstrapping" of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay).
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force by bootstrapping almost any hearsay statement into
admissible evidence.214
In many cases, however, this is a false dichotomy. A defen-
dant's threats, while not made during judicial proceedings, are
nonetheless made at times other than during the commission
of a crime, with the intent of preventing the witness from
testifying in court. As cases in other areas of the law have
demonstrated, it is possible to employ concepts of waiver to
cause a defendant to lose the right to confront not only in cases
of direct threats, but also in cases where the defendant per-
suades or controls a witness or even engages in a pattern of
conduct that has the effect of intimidating a witness.215
In fact, a theory of waiver, when precisely defined and
carefully applied, can provide greater protection to both defen-
dants and witnesses than the more commonly used hearsay
exceptions. Waiver addresses more directly the issue at the
heart of many child sexual abuse cases-the scope of the defen-
dant's right to confront a child witness and the procedures
which a defendant must follow in order to obtain the full scope
of that right. Once the scope of the right and the procedures
that must be followed to obtain it are determined, one can then
focus on the scope of the right when a defendant's actions do
not meet the level required for full exercise of the right. In this
way a court is able to analyze more directly the defendant's
actions and the effect of those actions on a child witness.
As Part II illustrates, this process of analysis cannot be
limited to the traditional waiver analysis employed by courts.
Rather, it is necessary to focus on the scope of the confronta-
tion right and the manner in which it should be applied to the
defendant. A defendant who procures the absence of a child
witness through threats is not making a deliberate and in-
formed decision to relinquish the confrontation right. Instead,
the court is providing the link between the defendant's actions
and their legal consequences. The court provides this link in
order to protect the interest of the state in shielding the child
witness from harm and preventing the defendant from profiting
by his own wrongdoing. Courts should be explicit about the
assumption which underlies a finding of waiver in this manner,
namely that the state's interests outweigh those of a defendant
214. See, e.g., State v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245, 1252 (Conn. 1987) (holding that
threats made to a child during the commission of an alleged act of child abuse are
insufficient to establish a waiver of the right to confrontation).
215. See supra Part I.A.2-4.
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who procures a child witness's absence because such a defen-
dant is not an intended beneficiary of the confrontation right.
To act fairly on this assumption, however, courts must
ensure that there is a high correlation between those defen-
dants who a court determines to be unintended beneficiaries
of the confrontation right and those who actually have threat-
ened a child witness. Courts should not lightly find waiver of
a right as important as the right to confront and should require
the state to provide legitimate and persuasive reasons when
it seeks to establish a waiver of this right. One way to accom-
plish this is by requiring clear and convincing evidence that a
defendant has threatened a witness.
Once this determination has been made, the Constitution
mandates that the defendant's due process rights still be
protected. Due process requires that the defendant receive the
functional equivalent of the trial he would have received had
the witness testified. This can be accomplished by admitting
the statements of an absent, threatened witness only to the
extent that those statements would have been admissible had
the witness testified.
2. Burden of Proof-Only one court has held that the
government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant is responsible for the witness's absence.216 Other
courts have analogized waiver by misconduct to preliminary
findings of fact on the admissibility of extra-judicial statements
and have required proof of intimidation only by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence ap-
proach, however, undervalues the connection between the right
to confrontation and the accuracy of the fact-finding process.
Courts should not lightly deprive a defendant of a primary
means of testing the reliability of the evidence against him.
This would be true under the strict theory of waiver found in
the Zerbst test. It is equally true of the more flexible model of
waiver that has been employed by courts in confrontation
waiver cases and further elaborated in this Note.
216. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,631 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982). The court rejected both the "reasonable doubt" standard and the
"preponderance" standard. Id. at 630-32; see also Judd Burstein, Admission of an
Unavailable Witness' Grand Jury Testimony: Can It Be Justified?, 4 CARDOZO L. REV.
263, 278 (1983) (commenting that "Thevis contains a principled and compelling
argument" in support of the clear and convincing standard). In addition, the court in
Mastrangelo was even more tentative in this regard: "[Blecause I remain in doubt as
to the appropriate burden of proof in respect to waiver in this case, in prudence I will
await the findings of the court below on remand." United States v. Mastrangelo, 693
F.2d 269,274 (2d Cir. 1982) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
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As has been shown, waiver of the confrontation right oper-
ates as a legal consequence resulting from a defendant's
misconduct and not from an intelligent relinquishment of a
known right. To obtain the benefit of this legal consequence
that is so devastating to the defendant, the prosecution should
be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant engaged in the procurement of a witness's absence.
Such a requirement will make it more likely that the state will
provide legitimate and compelling reasons to support its claim
of waiver.
3. Waiver of the Confrontation Right as a Waiver of Eviden-
tiary Objections-A number of courts have held that waiver of
the confrontation right is a fortiori a waiver of the right to
raise certain evidentiary exceptions.217 A waiver of the confron-
tation right may constitute a waiver of any evidentiary require-
ment that the declarant be subject to cross-examination to the
extent that the original admissibility was predicated on the
declarant's availability. Yet it does not necessarily follow that
other evidentiary requirements which are not dependent on the
availability of the witness should also be held to be waived.
Whether or not a court has determined that defendant's
misconduct has resulted in a witness's unavailability, the
statement should still meet "the evidentiary requirements that
the residual hearsay have circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness, that it be more probative than other evidence
reasonable available, that it be offered as evidence of material
fact, and that pretrial notice be given."218 If such requirements
are not met, waiver essentially penalizes a defendant who
procures a witness's absence by in effect allowing as evidence
any statement made by the unavailable declarant.
Waiver constructed in such a way would not merely alter the
form of the defendant's right to test the reliability of prosecu-
tion testimony, it would eliminate that right altogether. Such
a result conflicts with the requirement that a defendant who
waives the confrontation right receive the functional equivalent
of due process. Waiver of the confrontation right therefore
should lead only to waiver of hearsay objections regarding a
particular statement to the extent that the statement would
217. E.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980).
218. Edward D. Holmes, The Residual Exceptions: A Primer for Military Use, 94
MIL. L. REv. 15, 91 n.333 (1981).
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have been admissible had the witness testified.219 This limita-
tion will prevent a defendant from profiting from misconduct
while not penalizing a defendant or creating a greater tempta-
tion for the prosecution to attempt to establish waiver where
it does not exist.
CONCLUSION
Waiver of the confrontation right has been employed in a
number of instances to introduce hearsay statements of wit-
nesses who have been intimidated by a defendant into not
testifying at a trial. The manner in which waiver has been
employed in the past has resulted in a doctrine notable mostly
for its lack of precision and clarity. This has enabled courts to
reaffirm the right to confrontation in the abstract, while
avoiding the difficult analysis which application of the right
entails in particular settings.
The damage this can do to a defendant's consitutional rights
is great. Such damages can be minimized through the careful
application of waiver that acknowledges that waiver of the
confrontation right as a result of witness intimidation is a legal
fiction employed by courts to balance the competing interests
of the defendant and of the state. Waiver, when employed in
this manner, can be used in child sexual abuse cases to better
address the acts of a defendant in intimidating a witness. As
case law has illustrated, intimidation for the purpose of pre-
venting a witness from testifying can begin long before trial.
Such intimidation need not go unchecked, provided the defen-
dant possesses sufficient safeguards to ensure that waiver is
not merely used to avoid the difficult analysis which examina-
tion of the confrontation right entails.
219. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1053 (1983). For example, a declarant should not be able to testify to what a third
party told the threatened witness (absent an applicable hearsay exception) because
this would be hearsay even if the threatened witness had testified.
